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Nast v. Lockett: PUNmVE DAMAGES 
PERMITTED IN AUTOMOBILE 
NEGLIGENCE CASE WHERE 
DEFENDANT WAS BOTH 
INTOXICATED AND EXHIBITED A 
WANTON AND RECKLESS 
DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE. 
In Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d 
1113 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held it reversible error to with-
hold the issue of punitive damages from 
the jury in a civil automobile accident 
action where there existed sufficient evi-
dence that an intoxicated driver exhibited 
a wanton and reckless disregard for human 
life. 
On the evening of February 17, 1984, 
Edward Nast ("Nast"), Lois Lockett 
("Lockett"), and Charles Houck 
("Houck") were traveling on York Road, 
a four-lane thoroughfare in Baltimore 
County. Nast was proceeding south 
behind Lockett's vehicle. Houck was 
traveling north on York Road. Lockett 
attempted to make a U-turn onto the 
northbound lane, but was unable to com-
plete the turn without hitting the curb. 
Lockett then came to a full stop, and back-
ed up in order to complete the turn. 
Houck continued without braking or devi-
ating from his course, careened of Lock-
ett's car into the southbound lane off York 
Road, and struck the vehicle driven by 
Nast. Nast sustained personal injuries and 
property damage as a result of the colli-
SIon. 
Nast, and his wife, who was a passenger 
in his car at the time of the accident, 
entered suit in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages from Lockett and 
Houck based on drunken and negligent 
driving. The judge prevented the issue of 
punitive damages from deliberation before 
the jury due to insufficient proof of wan-
ton and willful disregard for human life. 
The jury awarded the N asts compensatory 
damages to be paid by each defendant. The 
Nasts appealed to the court of special 
appeals on the issue of punitive damages. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on 
their own motion, certified the case to 
consider the question of whether the lower 
court erred in withholding from the jury 
the issue of punitive damages. Id at 348, 
539 A.2d at 1115-16. 
The question of whether to award 
punitive damages is considered by the fact-
finder only if the evidence is sufficient to 
bring the issue before the finder of fact. 
The actual award of such damages is then 
left to the discretion of the factfinder. The 
court of appeals thus sought to determine 
whether the trial court was "right," or 
"wrong" in withholding the issue of 
punitive damages from the jury. Id at 349, 
539 A.2d at 1116. 
The court began its analysis by explain-
ing the criterion for awarding damages in 
Maryland. Compensatory damages are 
awarded "[a]s compensation, indemnity, 
or restitution for harm sustained ... " Id. at 
348, 539 A.2d at 1116, (citing McAlister v. 
Car~ 233 Md. 446, 451-57, 197 A.2d 140 
(1964». A finding of negligence and com-
pensable loss are conditions precedent to 
consideration of the issue of punitive 
damages. Id. 349, 539 A.2d 113, 114-16, 
(citing Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 
644, 291 A.2d 64 (1972)). Punitive damages 
are thereby awarded not as the measure of 
actual loss, but "as punishment for outra-
geous conduct and to deter future transa-
gressions." Id. (citing Black's Law 
Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis 
added). 
Initially, the standard regarding entitle-
ment of punitive damages required an ele-
ment of fraud, malice, evil intent or 
oppression entering into and forming part 
of the wrongful act. Philadelphia, W. & 
B.R.R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307 
(1884). This rule, however, was supplanted 
in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 
Md. 149,297 A.2d 721 (1972), wherein the 
court held that punitive damages in motor 
vehicle cases should be based on the stand-
ard applied in the crime of manslaughter 
by automobile. 
The statute creating the crime of man-
slaughter by automobile dictates that 
"[e]very person causing the death of 
another as a result of driving ... of an auto-
mobile ... in a grossly negligent manner, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be 
known as 'manslaughter by automo-
bile ... '" Md. Code Ann, art. 27, §388 
(1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.). Decisions inter-
preting the statute therefore require proof 
of gross negligence, which has been defin-
ed as "a wanton or reckless disregard for 
human life" in the operation of a motor 
vehicle, the requisites of which are knowl-
edge of the dangers and risks attendant to 
such conduct. The court in Smith further 
observed that since the requirement of 
gross negligence was adequately stringent 
to impose imprisonment, it was sufficient 
to form the basis of an award of punitive 
damages. Smith 267 Md. at 168,297 A.2d 
at 832. 
The standard of gross negligence is there-
fore met if the driver exhibited an extraor-
dinary or outrageous lack of concern for 
the safety of others. The court determined 
that "[i]t is not reckless driving that allows 
punitive damages; it is the reckless dis-
regard for human life." The determination 
thereof must be made "in light of evidence 
adduced at the trial tending to show that 
Lockett and Houck had consumed alco-
holic beverages shortly before their fortui-
tous meeting on York Road, and evidence 
regarding their condition as a result of 
their drinking." Id. at 352, 539 A.2d at 
1117-18. 
In Maryland, it is a misdemeanor to 
drive any vehicle while intoxicated, or 
under the influence of alcohol. Md. 
Transp. Code Ann. §21-902 (1977, 1982 
Repl. Vol.). The amount of alcohol in the 
blood of the drinking driver is admissible 
in both civil and criminal trials in order to 
show the degree of impairment of the 
driver. Unlike criminal causes, however, 
the percentage of alcohol in the blood does 
not give rise to any presumptions in civil 
actions. The plaintiffs in civil cases there-
fore have the burden of persuasion as to 
the degree of the defendant's impairment. 
Nast, 312 Md. 353, 539 A.2d at 1119, 
(citing Major v. State, .31 Md. App. 590, 
595, 358 A.2d 609 (1976». 
The court then evaluated the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Lockett and 
Houck's levels of inebriation after the acci-
dent. Initially, it was determined that 
Lockett had been drinking from approxi-
mately 6:45 p.m. to 8:15 p.m. on the eve-
ning of the accident. A blood specimen 
was taken from Ms. Lockett in conjunc-
tion with routine hospital procedure. 
Although the specimen was not taken for 
the purpose of determining blood alcohol 
content, an expert testified that a person 
with Lockett's ethyl alcohol content prob-
ably had a blood alcohol level "approxi-
mately in the range of .11 to .12 percent 
[by weight]." Id. There was no testimony 
in addition to the blood test as to Lockett's 
demeanor, appearance, or conduct, which 
might have provided any indicia of 
drunkeness. Id. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1120. 
The court determined that while the evi-
dence was sufficient to determine that 
Lockett was "under the influence," the 
evidence was not sufficient to prove that 
she was "intoxicated." Id. (Note: This 
decision was rendered before the July 1, 
1988 legislative enactment lowering the 
blood alcohol level of intoxication from 
.13 to .10.) 
As opposed to the facts and cir-
cumstances regarding Lockett, the court 
did not have the benefit of a sample of 
Houck's blood or breath. Houck, who 
refused tests necessary to determine blood 
alcohol content, denied consumption of 
alcohol on the night of the accident. His 
testimony, however, was discounted by 
statements of the investigating police offi-
cer, a paramedic, the medical doctor who 
treated him at the hospital, and a nurse, 
each of whom testified that Houck smelled 
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of alcohol. The aforementioned witnesses 
characterized Houck as uncooperative, 
combative, hostile, and belligerent. 
Another paramedic stated that Houck "ap-
peared to be intoxicated - he smelled of 
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, all he could 
do was moan, 'he could not converse.'" Id. 
In short, it was the considered opinion of 
those in contact with Houck after the acci-
dent that Houck consumed alcohol to the 
extent that his normal coordination, facul-
ties, and physical and mental abilities were 
substantially and materially impaired. Id. 
The trial judge, in consideration of the 
foregoing evidence, submitted the case to 
the jury on the question of the "proximate 
cause of this accident ... " and "the com-
pensatory damage aspects," but had "a 
serious problem sending it on punitive 
damages." The trial judge determined that, 
as a matter of law, neither Lockett, nor 
Houck exhibited such a wanton and reck-
less disregard for human life as would per-
mit him to submit the question of punitive 
damages to the jury. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at 
1121. 
The court of appeals, then considered 
the requisite conditions for the imposition 
of punitive damages:" 
We think that in civil automobile acci-
dent cases involving a drinking driver 
whether the driver had a wanton or 
reckless disregard for human life, in 
the operation of an automobile, is to 
be tested by a sliding scale. As the 
degree of impairment by the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol increases, the 
need for other aggravating cir-
cumstances lessens, and visa versa. 
Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. The court 
opined that the act of outrageous driving, 
as well as the act of driving after the point 
of voluntary intoxication, permitted the 
inference that the driver did not care 
whether he killed or injured others. The 
court clarified that "[ w ]hat must not be 
forgotten is that the discretion to award 
punitive damages becomes available only 
when the combination of relevant facts 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the driver had a wanton or 
reckless disregard for human life." Id. at 
363, 539 A.2d at 1123. Thus, individuals 
who drive negligently, but not outrageous-
ly, and who have not consumed alcohol 
beyond the point of intoxication are not 
subject to punitive damages. Id. 
The court concluded that regarding 
Lockett's case, the judge did not err in 
withholding the issue of punitive damages 
from the jury since, as a matter of law, the 
facts were not sufficient to indicate that 
she was legally intoxicated. The court of 
appeals did hold, however, that a finding 
by the jury that Houck was intoxicated 
would have been sufficient to infer that he 
exhibited a wanton or reckless disregard 
for human life, thus justifying an award of 
punitive damages. The facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding Houck's behavior 
were sufficient to indicate outrageous con-
duct. The lower court erred, therefore, in 
keeping from the jury the issued of 
punitive damages. Id. 
The holding in Lockett v. Nast reinforces 
legislation responding to the public senti-
ment for more stringent penalties against 
those who operate motor vehicles while 
intoxicated. Thus, punitive awards will be 
made available to an increasing number of 
drunk driving victims. The court warned, 
however, that "[t]he step we take today -
recognizing that one who drinks to the 
point of becoming intoxicated and then 
undertakes the operation of a motor vehi-
cle may be found to have had a wanton dis-
regard for human life - is not an 
invitation to claim punitive damages in 
any case where negligence and drinking 
can be shown." Id. at 370, 539 A.2d at 1127 
(emphasis added). 
-Jules R. Bricker 
Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth 
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership: JUDICIARY'S 
ABILITY TO A WARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES LIMITED 
In Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth 
Assocs. 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175 
(1988) the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the Circuit Court for 
Carroll County abused its discretion by 
imposing attorney's fees against the Legal 
Aid Bureau under Md. Rule 1-341. The 
court reasoned that Legal Aid produced 
factual issues for the consideration of the 
fact-finder and that the judge was clearly 
erroneous in finding that Legal Aid was 
motivated by "bad faith" and a "lack of 
substantial justification." As a result, the 
decision by the Circuit Court for Carroll 
County was reversed. 
The case revolved around a landlord-
tenant suit brought in the District Court 
for Carroll County. In 1981, Josephine 
Brunner and Salvatore Torres leased an 
apartment at a housing project known as 
Bishop's Garth. Three years later, Bishop's 
Garth sought restitution of the premises 
by bringing an action against Brunner and 
Torres, claiming breach of their lease. 
Through their counsel, the Legal Aid 
Bureau, the tenants requested a jury trial. 
The jury found in favor of the landlord. 
When the defendants' appeal was dismiss-
ed for procedural reasons, Bishop's Garth 
filed for and was granted attorney's fees 
under Md. Rule 1-341. 
In its opinion, the court of special 
appeals drew particular attention to a 
meeting between a Legal Aid attorney and 
the managing general partner of Bishop's 
Garth. The Legal Aid lawyer requested 
photostats of other tenants' complaints 
against Brunner and Torres, along with 
pictures showing Brunner and Torres's 
children damaging the housing project's 
property. When denied this information, 
the Legal Aid attorney allegedly 
announced, "I'm sure you know that we 
can stretch this thing out. ... Based on 
that fact, don't you think it might be to 
your advantage to come to some agree-
ment with Mrs. Brunner and - save your-
self some money?" Id. at 219, 540 A.2d at 
fi77. In a footnote, the court referred to 
The Maryland Lawyers Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct. They then commented 
that there was no doubt that the lawyer's 
"somewhat tactless remarks" inspired the 
plaintiffs request for punitive measures 
pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. Id. at 219, 540 
A.2d at 1178. 
Maryland Rule 1-341, which corre-
sponds with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, declares 
In any civil action, if the court finds 
that the conduct of any party in main-
taining or defending any proceeding 
was in bad faith or without substantial 
justification, the court may require the 
offending party or the attorney advis-
ing the conduct or both of them to pay 
to the adverse party the costs of the 
proceeding and the reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by the adverse par-
ty in opposing it. 
Rule 1-341's "bad faith" requirement 
encompasses the notion that before sanc-
tions can be applied, one must act "for 
purposes of delay." Blanton v. Equitable 
Bank, 61 Md. App. 158, 163, 485 A.2d 694 
(1985). 
The court of special appeals was disturb-
ed by the trial judge's finding that the 
tenants' indulgence in a jury trial and 
subsequent appeal was not in good faith 
and bereft of substantial justification. The 
trial judge expounded that the request for 
a jury trial was motivated by a desire for 
delay in order to unduly coerce Bishop's 
Garth to dismiss the action. Md. Rule 1-
341, however, is inapplicable to justifiable 
delays, especially if the behavior causing 
the delay concerns the assertion of a funda-
mental right. Legal Aid, 540 A.2d at 
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